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A B S T R A C T
In recent years, the service discipline has seen the emergence of a number of novel conceptual approaches, one
in particular, called Transformative Service Research (TSR) focuses on wellbeing improvement and relieving suf-
fering through service. However, service related wellbeing efforts can have both intended but also unintended
consequences when aiming at co-creating value with individuals, communities or society at large. Nevertheless,
academic debate lacks clarity regarding the effects of the directedness of service exchange and the outcome of
transformative service in regard to, but also beyond, the focal actors involved. Directedness of service co-creation
is closely related to the construct of intentionality. This conceptual paper aims to untangle this pivotal construct
to comprehend actors’ intended co-creative wellbeing efforts to alleviate suffering of other actors, and it pays
attention to potential unintended side effects. The paper synthesizes literature from philosophy and psychology
relating to the construct of intentionality and applies it to wellbeing co-creation and co-destruction. Illustrative
scenarios are used to support the lines of argument. The paper demonstrates how applying the literature on in-
tentionality to transformative service contexts can assist in bringing greater transparency to the discussion of the
directedness of service related wellbeing efforts and potential spill-over effects. When designing transformative
services to improve wellbeing, service providers are urged to develop an awareness regarding their services and
potential side effects. Likewise, policymakers responsible for devising, revising and (re-)implementing healthcare
and social policies should consider such potential spill-over effects when formulating public policy guidelines.
Equally, service scholars should integrate the construct of intentionality in any discussion of service-to-service
exchange. This paper is amongst the first to draw on the concept of intentionality and introduces it to service
research in the context of wellbeing co-creation.
1. Introduction
Calls to action in service research to address society's major chal-
lenges have increased (for example, Finsterwalder, 2017; Fisk et al.,
2016; Gebauer and Reynoso, 2013; Ostrom et al. 2015). Despite
the implicit use of intentionality in the discussion of value co-creation,
co-destruction and wellbeing (Harris and Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; An-
derson et al., 2013; Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010), it has nei-
ther received sufficient attention nor been applied to the context of
value co-creation, value co-destruction and resulting wellbeing effects,
with a few recent exceptions (for example, Kuppelwieser and Finster-
walder, 2016; Neghina et al., 2015; Taillard et al., 2016). Kup-
pelwieser and Finsterwalder (2016, p. 95) introduce the term “in-
tentionality of value co-creation” and refer to the discourse on well-
being co-creation via services, as also put forward in Transformative
Service Research (TSR, Anderson et al., 2013; Rosenbaum et al.,
2011). They assert that the concept of TSR captures both intended
and unintended wellbeing co-creation. Taillard et al. (2016) later
use the concepts of intentionality and agency to discuss the emergence
of service ecosystems; however, because of their focus on system lev-
els, the authors do not include positive or negative intended or unin-
tended effects in their conceptualisation. By contrast, Plé and Chumpi-
taz Cáceres (2010; Harris and Ogbonna, 2002, 2006) highlight the
intentional and accidental (mis)use of resources and potential effects
on value co-creation and co-destruction but fail to introduce the con-
struct of intentionality. In a similar vein, Anderson et al. (2013) point
to the intended and unintended effects of services in the wake of the
co-creation of wellbeing. That is, some services might generate “ripple”
or “spill-over effects” that go beyond the services' intended outcomes.
Neghina et al. (2015) briefly explore the construct of shared inten-
tionality when discussing joint value co-creation, however an in-depth
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discussion as well as an application to the wellbeing context are missing.
Nonetheless, while unintended effects of wellbeing have only very
recently been highlighted as an important TSR research topic (see
Blocker et al., 2019), the connected construct of intentionality, which
is pivotal to providing clarity in regard to unintended effects, has been
neglected in the field of service research. Therefore, this paper expands
on the initial notion by Anderson et al. (2013) that (un)intended ef-
fects of wellbeing co-creation can affect third actors. It addresses these
issues with regard to the desired directedness in service exchange preva-
lent in existing theories and approaches, such as in TSR, as well as
related value co-creation and co-destruction behaviours and wellbeing
outcomes, by introducing intentionality to the discussion.
The paper follows MacInnis (2011, 2016) suggestions for the de-
sign of a conceptual manuscript and introduces individual and collec-
tive intentionality as a novel concept to TSR theorising. As such, this
research's “reason why” (MacInnis, 2016) is a response to recent calls
to increase work on TSR (Ostrom et al., 2010, 2015) and unintended
effects in particular (Blocker et al., 2019). The response aims to create
a better understanding of (un)intended effects of value co-creation, as it
is equally important for policymakers and practitioners when designing
wellbeing enhancing services and formulating related regulations, as it
is for researchers to generate new research and insights (Blocker et al.,
2019; MacInnis, 2011). To achieve this, this paper entails an in-depth
examination of actors' efforts when co-creating wellbeing in the light of
intentionality. While recent years have seen a rise in wellbeing related
research in the marketing and service disciplines (for example, Beirão
et al., 2017; McColl-Kennedy et al., 2017; Nambisan and Nam-
bisan, 2009; Sweeney et al., 2015), the construct of intentionality
has been disregarded. However, it has been quite crucial in other disci-
plines with a focus on wellbeing, such as in medicine and nursing (for
example, Clifford et al., 2008; Lehane and McCarthy, 2007a,b).
2. Literature review
2.1. Co-creating wellbeing and value
2.1.1. Transformative service co-creation
Transformative services centre on “creating uplifting changes and
improvements in the wellbeing of both individuals and communities”
(Anderson et al., 2011, p. 3). The emerging sub-field of TSR is a
blend of consumer and service research encompassing all humans and
nature, i.e. the ecosystem (Anderson et al., 2011, 2013; Ostrom et
al., 2014). TSR employs and adapts concepts and “tools” from service
research to enhance the lives of individuals and communities (Gustafs-
son et al., 2015). Ostrom et al. (2014) identify TSR-related themes
in prior research, such as co-creation, wellbeing and service systems.
TSR looks at the metrics of wellbeing, such as physical health, mental
health, financial wellbeing, discrimination, marginalisation, literacy, in-
clusion, access and disparity, among others (Anderson et al., 2013;
Rosenbaum et al., 2011). Anderson et al. (2013) propose a frame-
work of four different dimensions that can be used to conceptualise re-
search on wellbeing. These are: service entities, consumer entities, the
macro environment and wellbeing outcomes. Both the themes and the
dimensions indicate a breadth of research that investigates the combi-
nation of service and wellbeing, and it has been suggested that these
themes can fall under the umbrella of TSR. The present article focuses
on all four dimensions, that is, on service and consumer entities, in
other words the actors within the framework, as well as on wellbeing
outcomes (i.e., in this case both the intended and unintended effects)
and on the environment (for example, public policy) (Anderson et al.,
2013). Recent work has conceptualised wellbeing as value and this pa-
per follows this notion (Black and Gallan, 2015; Hepi et al., 2017).
Wellbeing outcome is the realised and experienced value by the actor
which results from co-creative activities (Chen et al., 2019) in a par-
ticular sociocultural context via a process of sense and meaning mak-
ing (Finsterwalder et al., 2017). While such wellbeing perspective
applies a co-creative approach (Anderson et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2019), it measures the individual actor's health via its conceptualisation
as subjective wellbeing (Diener and Chan, 2011; Diener et al., 2015,
2018; Pera and Viglia, 2015).
In TSR, actors co-create wellbeing with other actors. The “recipi-
ents” of wellbeing co-creation can be individual consumers or collective
consumer entities, such as families, communities, neighbourhoods, cities
and nations (Anderson et al., 2013) and thus can be located at differ-
ent system levels within a service ecosystem (Fisk et al., 2016; Vargo
and Lusch, 2016), i.e. from the micro (for example, an individual con-
sumer) to the macro level (for example, a nation).
In such an ecosystem, service entities influence the environment and
the consumer entities residing within. Service entities’ interactions in
the ecosystem affect consumer entities either positively or negatively.
Equally, conflicts between consumer entities may occur as a result of
an emphasis of wellbeing efforts on certain actors (Anderson et al.,
2013). For example, after a major natural catastrophe, emergency units
might allocate their resources to people who are within close reach. Al-
though more distant individuals or communities might need medical
and other help more urgently, prevailing environmental conditions (for
example, weather or blocked roads) might prevent the emergency units
from reaching the other actors (Kuppelwieser and Finsterwalder,
2016). This might lead to a disadvantage and a further decline in the
wellbeing of the more distant actors in need, and to a conflict with emer-
gency services or the regional council.
This paper focuses on both types of actors, i.e. service and consumer
entities, at the lowest (micro) system level to explain the conceptualisa-
tion of the impact of actor-to-actor interactions and potential spill-over
effects on other actors and the (wider) community. Hence, for illustra-
tive purposes, this work highlights wellbeing co-creation between two
individual actors, i.e. (representatives of) consumer and service entities
in an interaction.
From a general perspective, these and other individuals and commu-
nities can experience two types of outcomes: eudaimonic and hedonic
wellbeing outcomes. Eudaimonic wellbeing describes the realisation of
human potential. It contains elements that allow people to flourish and
to improve themselves. Anderson et al. (2013) list eudaimonic wellbe-
ing elements, such as access to a service, health, decreasing health and
wellbeing disparities, consumer involvement, respect, support and social
networks. Hedonic wellbeing focuses on the idea of happiness and the
attainment of pleasure while avoiding pain (Ryan and Deci, 2001).
Anderson et al. (2013) identify elements of hedonic wellbeing, includ-
ing life satisfaction, positive affect and the absence of negative affect.
2.1.2. Increasing and decreasing wellbeing and value
In TSR, the most important indicators are both increasing and de-
creasing wellbeing (Anderson and Ostrom, 2015). As much as trans-
formative services aim to enhance wellbeing and avoid a decrease in
welfare, intended value co-creation efforts to generate or improve well-
being for some can also result in unintended wellbeing outcomes for
these or other actors (cf. Anderson et al., 2013; Blocker et al., 2019;
Rosenbaum et al., 2011). Here, value co-creation becomes a dou-
ble-edged sword. For example, social services may centre on providing
support for certain ethnic groups and members of society but do not
actively target other ethnic minorities who may feel abandoned. More-
over, discrimination of certain actors might occur due to politics, power
relations, or status among other factors (Hepi et al., 2017). This might
result not only in unintentional negative effects and tensions (Kuppel-
wieser and Finsterwalder, 2016) but also in a decline in the health of
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Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres (2010) and Echeverri and Skålén
(2011) discuss the possibility of what they call value co-destruction
amongst actors. Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres (2010, pp. 431) define
value co-destruction as “as an interactional process between service sys-
tems that results in a decline in at least one of the systems’ well-being
(which (…) can be individual or organizational)”. During this interac-
tion, the focal service systems interrelate either directly (person-to-per-
son) or indirectly (for example, via applications such as goods) through
the integration and use of resources. Here, the underlying assumption
is that the use of resources in value co-creation might have an unde-
sired impact on one or all of the parties involved. The example given is
a customer not looking after their car and letting it deteriorate and then
blaming the car manufacturer for it, publicly damaging their image. It
is suggested that this equates to a misuse of available resources by one
of the actors from the perspective of another actor in the same service
system (Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010). Misuse of resources can
be either accidental or deliberate.
Accidental misuse might be customers being unclear about how to
apply resources in a co-innovation process, which leads to the wastage
of resources and potentially detrimental effects on the customers' well-
being. Here, the process of value co-creation turns into a process of value
co-destruction. However, a value co-creation process might also result
in the creation of perceived value for one but experience of value de-
struction for the other party. For example, customers taking up a lot of
the employees’ time to attend to their affairs might get a better return
(value for customer), but the firm cannot deal with other customers in
the meantime (destroyed value for firm) (Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres
2010).
Deliberate misuse could be the misuse of resources by one actor to
increase their wellbeing to the detriment of another actor's welfare (Plé
and Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010). For example, call centres trying to
increase the number of completed “cases” per day by minimising time
per call through scripted procedures will increase productivity and effi-
ciency for the service provider (value for firm) to the potential detriment
of the customer who does not receive proper service (destroyed value
for customer) (Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010).
In their work, Echeverri and Skålén (2011) focus on the concept
of interactive value formation and investigate congruent (value co-cre-
ative) and incongruent (value co-destructive) contexts and practices dur-
ing value formation. They state that value formation is not only linked
to positive outcomes and connotations but they view value co-creation
as the process by which providers and customers collaboratively create
value. By the same token, they view value co-destruction as the collabo-
rative destruction of or decrease in value by the parties (Echeverri and
Skålén 2011). Using practice theory (Reckwitz, 2002), the authors
analyse a public transport provider and discover five distinct interac-
tion value formation practices between providers (tram and bus drivers)
and customers. In the context investigated, the five practices can lead
to either value co-creation or value co-destruction. The study focuses its
analysis on the interactive processes, i.e. direct actor-to-actor practices.
Yet, implicitly but not alluded to, some of the practical examples used to
illustrate the findings relate to intentional and unintentional aspects of
interactive value formation, as well as “other third actors” not directly
involved in the examined practices and the value formation processes.
The focus of both of these research studies is on directed value
co-creation or co-destruction processes and outcomes (Kuppelwieser
and Finsterwalder, 2016), that is, they centre on direct service ex-
changes (Chandler and Vargo, 2011). TSR includes both directed and
non-directed outcomes of wellbeing initiatives in its conceptualisation
(Kuppelwieser and Finsterwalder, 2016). Consequently, wellbeing
co-creation directed at certain consumer entities might have non-di-
rected “spill-over” effects on other third actors originally not included
in the
service entity's wellbeing efforts. Here, the notion of intentionality pro-
vides a useful concept to analyse different co-creation and co-destruc-
tion contexts in the light of value and wellbeing.
3. Intentionality
3.1. Intention vs intentionality
The notion of intentionality can be traced back to thinkers like Plato
and Aristotle (Mele, 2001; O'Madagain, 2013). It was also discussed
by scholars such as Thomas Aquinas in medieval times (Brower and
Brower-Toland, 2008; Burnyeat, 2001; Cohen, 1982). Brentano
(1874/2009) is credited with rehabilitating the term in philosophy by
drawing on Aristotle (Caston, 2002; Jacob, 2014). More recently,
apart from the discipline of philosophy examining the construct in depth
(for example, Gillett and McMillan, 2001; Kriegel, 2011; Prinz,
2012; Simchen, 2012; Textor, 2019), also in connection with other
concepts such as the “theory of action” (Searle, 1980), intentional-
ity has been studied in psychology within the paradigms of “theory of
mind” and “attribution theory” (D'Esterre et al., 2019; Malle et al.,
2001). However, also other disciplines, such as biological sciences, have
explored the notion of intentionality (Boehm, 2018).
Intentionality has two distinct meanings. The first one refers to
Brentano's (1874/2009) conception that intentionality relates to the
property of all mental states as being directed towards something. Al-
though Brentano (1874/2009) explains that it is distinctive of all acts
of consciousness, his former student Husserl (1900, 1901) refutes this
notion. Whichever stance is taken, intentionality can be defined as the
“property of being about, or directed at, something” (Le Morvan, 2005,
p. 285). Hence, intentionality is “aboutness” (Gillett and McMillan,
2001, p. 11; Mendelovici, 2018, p. 4; Simchen, 2012, p. XI). For ex-
ample, thinking about a piano means that one's thoughts chooses a pi-
ano (O'Madagain, 2013). Intentionality is also directedness that “arises
from pointing towards or attending to some target” (Jacob, 2014). For
example, following the work of Searle (1983), Malle et al. (2001)
illustrate that desires may be directed towards attractive objects, or be-
liefs might be directed towards states of affairs. Hence, intentionality re-
quires consciousness. Gillett and McMillan (2001, p. 12; Brentano,
1874) speak of the “intentionality of consciousness”. Searle (1991, p.
52; see also Addis, 2005, p. 3) refers to “intrinsic intentionality [that]
is genuinely mental” to describe the intra-individual and purely intellec-
tual processes.
The second meaning of intentionality describes the property of ac-
tions that are purposeful, meant or done intentionally (Malle et al.,
2001). Cognitive neuroscientists understand “intentional action [as] in-
volv[ing] (…) a distinctive conscious experience that ‘I’ am the author
of the action” (Haggard and Clark, 2003, p. 695). This intentional-
ity or “intentional action” (Knobe, 2006, p. 204; Searle, 1980, p. 47)
is labelled “extrinsic intentionality” here, a term derived from the Latin
word extrinsicus for outwardly (Oxford Dictionaries, 2019a).
Intentionality should not be confused with intention, although the
two terms are related (Bratman, 1984). Psychology tends to equate
these two terms, while people's everyday use, as well as the philosoph-
ical understanding, separate the two (Malle et al., 2001; Malle and
Nelson, 2003). There is a difference “between acting intentionally and
having an intention to act” (Bratman, 1984, p. 376). External inten-
tionality is the execution of intended actions, whereas intention is an
agent's mental state and represents the aim to undertake these actions.
On the one hand, the mental state connected to intentions often but not
always precedes its corresponding action, as intention may also occur
without the action (Malle et al., 2001). For example, a medical spe-
cialist's intention might be to heal the patient, but they fail to follow
through with executing this. On the other hand, the intentionality of an
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al., 2001). The specialist healing the patient is credited with having had
the intention to doing so.
Fig. 1 demonstrates the connection between intrinsic intentional-
ity, intention and extrinsic intentionality. Intention(ality) requires an
agent or intender (Malle et al., 2001), i.e. an actor in the intentional
state; the intentum or noema (Husserl, 1913; Spear, 2016; Tamini-
aux, 2015), which signifies the intentional content (“act-matter”); and
the “intentio”, i.e. the intentional process of consciousness or noesis
(“act-quality”) (Husserl, 1913; Spear, 2016). These are the intrinsic
mental activities. External intentionality is acting purposefully.
3.2. Components of intention(ality)
Malle and Knobe (1997) analyse the connection between intention
and (extrinsic) intentionality, or intentional action. They explore the lay-
man's notion of the two concepts, and their study reveals five compo-
nents, some of which have already been alluded to above. Fig. 2 illus-
trates Malle and Knobe’s (1997) findings.
For an agent to perform an action intentionally, the agent must have
a) a desire for an outcome, b) beliefs about an action that can lead to
such an outcome, c) an intention to perform the action and d) aware-
ness of the act whilst performing it (Malle and Knobe, 1997; Malle
and Nelson, 2003). Furthermore, Malle and Knobe (1997) analyse
whether skills are an implicit part of the construct. Their study shows
that, apart from awareness, the presence of skills is necessary in or-
der to ascribe intentionality. Moreover, the study reveals that people
clearly discriminate between judgments of intention (trying, attempt-
ing or planning) and judgments of intentionality (performing an action
intentionally) (Malle and Knobe, 1997; Malle and Nelson, 2003).
Hence, Malle and Knobe (1997) attain their five-component model of
intentionality based on the layman's understanding that the direct cause
of intentional action is intention, and for it to be attributed, desire and
belief components are essential, but in order for the action to be per-
formed intentionally, awareness and skills are mandatory.
Common understanding also holds that all human behaviour is ei-
ther intentional or unintentional (Knobe, 2006; Malle, 1999). Deviat-
ing somewhat from Searle (1980) here, this paper defines a success-
fully undertaken intentional action as consisting of realised aligned in-
tention. Unintentional action has aspects that are not intended, mean
ing they were not the conditions for satisfying the intended action
(Searle, 1980).
3.3. Individual vs collective intention(ality)
Thus far, this paper has referred to an agent-to-subject/object rela-
tionship, i.e. an agent-to-actor/agent-to-resource scenario when relating
to intention(ality). However, more recent work on intentionality also
includes “collective intentionality” (Christopher 2018, p. 680; Searle,
1990, p. 414; Zahavi, 2018). Such intentionality becomes more perti-
nent due to the fact that recent service research (for example, Fehrer
et al., 2018; Li et al. 2017; McColl-Kennedy et al., 2012; Tombs
and McColl-Kennedy, 2003) not only explores dyadic contexts (ac-
tor-to-actor) but also looks beyond the dyad and focuses on multi-ac-
tor contexts in service ecosystems. Depending on the position along
a continuum from intrinsic to extrinsic intentionality, collective inten-
tionality can be referred to as “we-intentions” (Schmid, 2018, p. 231;
Tuomela, 2005, p. 327; Tuomela and Miller, 1988, p. 367), “collec-
tive intentions” (O'Madagain, 2014, p. 347; Gold and Sugden, 2007,
p. 109), “shared intention” (Alonso, 2009, p. 444), “shared intention-
ality” (Schmid, 2012, p. 349; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007, p.
121), “shared cooperative activity” (Bratman, 1992, p. 327) or “inten-
tionality of joint action” (Tuomela, 1991, p. 235).
Collective or shared intentions are those intentions that are con-
cerned with joint actions (Gold and Sugden, 2007) and can be de-
fined as being jointly directed at goals or targets, objects, matters of fact,
states of affairs or values (Schweikard and Schmid, 2013). Collec-
tive intention is not reducible to the summation of multiple individual
intentions (Searle, 1990). Actors are intertwined in that “each agent
must have intentions in favor of the efficacy of the intentions of the
other” (Bratman, 1992, p. 335). This involves some commitment and
disposition to make the other's aims one's own (Schmid, 2011). In sit-
uations where joint intention leads to joint intentional action, there is
“a sense in which ‘we’ intend the joint action, as well as a sense in
which ‘I’ intend my part in it” (Gold and Sugden, 2007, p. 109). In-
sofar as individuals share intentions, they might also claim shared own-
ership of a joint action. However, there is a prerogative that individuals
only “own” their intentionality, which contradicts the claim that collec
Fig. 1. Intentional consciousness, intention and intentional action.
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tive intention(ality) is irreducible to individual ones (Gallotti and
Huebner, 2017; Schmid, 2008). Notwithstanding this argument, joint
intentionality is expressed as “an action performable by several agents
who suitably relate their individual actions to each other's actions in
pursuit (…) of some joint goal or in adherence to some common rules,
practices, or the like that qualifies as a we-attitude content. (…) Inten-
tional joint action requires (…) a joint intention” (Tuomela, 1991, pp.
247). Collective or shared intentionality means entering the “We Do-
main (…) [as] the locus of value co-creation” (FitzPatrick et al., 2015,
p. 466). Recent work claims that (collective) intentionality might shape
forms of human behaviour more profoundly than originally thought
(Kern and Moll, 2017). This might particularly be true for co-creative
interactions in transformative services.
4. Intentionality and the co-creation of transformative services
4.1. Intentionality and the value co-creation and value co-destruction spill-
over effects
This paper adopts the term “intentionality of value co-creation”
(Kuppelwieser and Finsterwalder, 2016, p. 95) to indicate that ac-
tors might act intentionally or unintentionally when they create or de-
stroy value for other actors at the same time they are creating or de-
stroying value for themselves (Lepak et al., 2007). Furthermore, the
act of value co-creation or co-destruction might have “reach” beyond
these focal actors in such exchange. This notion relates to Lepak et
al.‘s (2007, p. 186) call that “any discussion of value creation must
clearly articulate both the target of the value and the party that pro-
duces the value and is intended to benefit from it”. What the current
debate captures as value co-creation effort (Sweeney et al., 2015) and
value-in-use in (social) context (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Edvards-
son et al., 2011) equals one actor's intentional effort to co-create value
and an(other) actor's perceived value-in-use in a specific context when
realising the co-created value.
The present paper relates to both the targeted and non-targeted ac-
tors in the wake of wellbeing co-creation and co-destruction. It proposes
that the actors involved in the original value co-creation (or co-destruc-
tion) process might be the ones to co-create and experience value based
on shared intention(ality), however, such co-creative acts might affect
them but also others not directly involved in this process, either posi-
tively or negatively. This is termed the value co-creation or co-destruc-
tion spill-over effect. Here, the concept of intentionality enhances the
understanding of the current value co-creation discussion as “[v]alue
creation may take place on different levels of consciousness” (Grönroos
and Voima, 2013, p. 138).
4.2. Scenarios of intentional and unintentional value co-creation and co-
destruction
“Any segment of (…) time can encompass a diversity of doings and
sayings, intentional, unintentional (…)” (Schatzki, 2010, p. 114). To
unravel intentional and unintentional value co-creation and co-destruc-
tion leading to an increase or decrease in wellbeing for some, if not all
of the directly but also indirectly involved entities or actors, this section
discusses scenarios that aim to explain different forms of (un)intentional
actions and potential spill-over effects.
Scenarios are “postulated sequence[s] or development[s] of events”
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2019b) and utilised “as prospective sensemak-
ing devices” (Wright, 2005, p. 86). This is based on the finding that
“transformational change is observed to occur through inductive [the-
orising]” (Wright, 2005, p. 86). This notion aligns well with the con-
cept of TSR and (un)intended consequences of wellbeing measures. The
use of scenarios permits the provision of a means for mental experi-
mentation via the formulation of options which help structure potential
realities and examine their consequences using a range of plausible con-
texts which then lead to an increased confidence in decision making (cf.
Van der Heijden et al., 2002). Eight different scenarios are utilised
to explicate events leading to (un)intended consequences of wellbeing
measures. Fig. 3 depicts the first four scenarios focusing on intentional
actions that lead to either value co-creation and increase (scenarios 1
and 2) or value co-destruction and decrease (scenarios 3 and 4) of well-
being. Furthermore, individual (scenarios 2 and 4) and collective or
shared (scenarios 1 and 3) intentionality can be distinguished. For rea-
sons of simplification, but also to illustrate wellbeing interactions on the
lowest level of a service system (micro level), two focal actors are at the
centre of the explorations.
Scenario 1Collective intentional value co-creation that increases wellbe-
ing
Scenario 1 shows a scenario where value or wellbeing is recipro-
cally co-created. Assume two actors A1 and A2. Let A1 be a brain spe-
cialist/neurologist working in a private clinic. Let A2 be a stroke patient
who has no living relatives or partner and is in the care of the clinic,
seeking help (desire) after a medical incident. A2 believes help can
be provided, i.e. A2 has the intention (belief + desire) that interaction
with A1 will primarily improve their eudaimonic wellbeing. The patient
is cognizant of their own situation and provides detailed, structured
and conclusive information (awareness and skills) about their wellbe-
ing, pain levels, bodily functions (intention + awareness + skills = in-
tentional action) (Malle and Knobe, 1997). A2 works with the spe-
cialist A1 to assist with analysing their own brain's condition by un-
dergoing brain scans and other tests. After analysing A2's test results,
the well-trained and experienced neurologist A1 administers the cor-
rect drugs in the correct dosage to A2 (intentional action). A1 realises
value-in-use for themselves through perceived satisfaction with their
treatment success (hedonic wellbeing). A2 realises value through im-
proved eudaimonic wellbeing by being better off. This scenario can be
termed a shared intentional value co-creation process because both ac-
tors have collective intentions to work together in the healing process
and do so collectively and intentionally (Gallotti and Huebner, 2017).
Scenario 2Individual intentional value co-creation that increases
wellbeing
Scenario 2 depicts a somewhat different situation. A critical care
specialist (A1) monitors a coma patient's (A2) condition and administers
the correct drugs to A2. A2 has no living relatives or partner. A1 acts with
an intentionality comparable to that of the brain specialist in scenario
1. However, A2 is unconscious and cannot articulate themselves or act
in any way. Here, the intention of what the patient might want (for ex-
ample, to live or die) cannot be assumed, and the patient is incapable
of any intentional acts to actively aid with co-creating the improvement
of their own wellbeing. Hence, this scenario describes an individual ac-
tor's (A1) intentional value co-creation process that improves wellbeing
both for A1 themselves, who realises value through job satisfaction, in-
creasing their hedonic wellbeing, and for A2. However, due to A2 be-
ing unconscious their eudaimonic wellbeing improvement can only be
observed or measured objectively, i.e. by the specialist utilising certain
technology to monitor A2's bodily functions. Perceived value and “feel-
ing better off”, i.e. subjective wellbeing (Diener et al., 2015) can only
be determined consciously by A2 after waking up from their coma.
Scenario 3Collective intentional value co-destruction that decreases
wellbeing
Scenario 3 depicts an interaction that leads to value co-destruction.
In this scenario, A1, the brain specialist, administers a speciality drug to
A2, the stroke patient. However, afterwards A1 and A2 jointly destroy
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Fig. 3. Intentional value co-creation and co-destruction.
tional value co-destruction interaction. Owing to the misconduct (value
co-destruction), no other patient can realise value. This, at least in the
short-term, might lead to a decrease in eudaimonic wellbeing of other
actors in the vicinity, i.e. other patients (for example, AN and AM in Fig.
3) as well as other specialists (for eample, AO and AP) aiming at admin-
istering the same drug.
Scenario 4Individual intentional value co-destruction that decreases
wellbeing
The last scenario of intentional value co-creation/co-destruction de-
scribes a situation (scenario 4) that decreases wellbeing for one of the
two actors involved. A1, the critical care specialist, does not monitor
coma patient A2's condition. A2 has no family or other ties. Here, in-
dividual intentional value co-destruction takes place with patient A2's
health deteriorating.
A second set of scenarios (see Fig. 4) focuses on unintentional value
co-creation or co-destruction outcomes for some actors. These scenarios
recognise unintentional value co-creation (scenarios 5 and 6) as well as
value co-destruction (scenarios 7 and 8). The scenarios can be classified
as unintentional collective co-destruction (cf. Chant, 2007) or co-cre-
ation (scenarios 5 and 7) or can be denoted as individual unintentional-
ity (scenarios 6 and 8) due to certain actions.
Scenario 5Collective unintentional value co-creation that increases
wellbeing
Scenario 5 describes a situation in which A1, a brain specialist in-
tends to heal stroke patient A2. During the challenging treatment pro-
cedure A1 utilises all available means of care (intentionality). In con-
junction with A2, A1 coincidently discovers a new treatment regime due
to a minor earth tremor having spilled some previously non-combined
medicinal ingredients into the patient's remedy. This collective uninten-
tional discovery (Chant, 2007) – albeit with an uncontrollable cause
(Malle and Knobe, 1997) – is also useable for other patients with
the same condition. As a result, not only does A2's wellbeing increase
(value through increase in eudaimonic wellbeing), but so does their
family's hedonic wellbeing, thanks to the prospect of their loved one's
life being saved. In addition, other patients' (depicted as AN and AM in
Fig. 4) life expectancy increases (eudaimonic value) because of the new
treatment. This realised value by actors other than the intended ones can
be called a value co-creation spill-over effect. A1 attracts funding for re-
search and further development of the new drug (hedonic wellbeing in-
creases through positive affect; eudaimonic wellbeing improves through
esteem from colleagues). Other specialists (visualised as AO and AP) in
other locations learn about the specialist's discovery, which generates
another value co-creation spill-over effect because these specialists can
now utilise the new drug for their patients. Thus, scenario 5 showcases
collective unintentional value co-creation including spill-over effects.
Scenario 6Individual unintentional value co-creation that increases well-
being
Scenario 6 depicts individual unintentional value co-creation, which
increases wellbeing. Assume that critical care specialist A1 accidently
administers a different treatment to coma patient A2 (unintentional act),
whose family realises value through an increase in hedonic wellbeing
due to the patient's positive reaction to this treatment and the increasing
likelihood of survival. The value co-creation spill-over effect here relates
to A2's family system (AN and AM in Fig. 4). Value co-creation in this
scenario has a controllable cause (Malle and Knobe, 1997) but is of
an individually unintentional kind: A1 might increase their own hedonic
wellbeing through the discovery which might boost their self-confidence
and perceived job satisfaction. In addition, A1 might experience value
due to A2's family providing positive feedback. Moreover, the specialist
can now remedy the inefficient previous treatment and utilise the new
treatment regime for future patients.
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Fig. 4. Unintentional value co-creation and co-destruction.
Scenario 7 in Fig. 4 now moves to a value co-destruction scenario
with collectively unintentional action (Chant, 2007) which decreases
wellbeing. Brain specialist A1 aims to administer contrast agent to a
stroke patient (A2) for a brain scan. Due to a sudden move of the pa-
tient, potentially caused by a certain level of distress prior to the scan,
the specialist drops the contrast agent which enters the scanner's main
console (controllable cause; Malle and Knobe, 1997). An electrical
short circuit following this renders the brain scanner unusable. Due to
the lack of available means for proper diagnosis and subsequent treat-
ment in this location, A2's wellbeing deteriorates, their family (actors
AN and AM) is distraught due to the decrease in both hedonic and eu-
daimonic wellbeing. Specialist A1 experiences hostility from their col-
leagues (AO and AP), an experience that decreases wellbeing due to a
loss of respect, status, positive affect and satisfaction (Anderson et al.,
2013). This scenario signals a collective unintentional value co-destruc-
tion process decreasing value for the directly involved parties but also
generating spill-over effects on either side due to other actors experienc-
ing a decrease in value or wellbeing.
Scenario 8Individual unintentional value co-destruction that de-
creases wellbeing
The last scenario (8) demonstrates individual unintentional value
co-destruction when A1, a critical care specialist who has every inten-
tion of helping A2, by accident administers the treatment incorrectly to
A2 (controllable cause; Malle and Knobe, 1997). In this scenario, A2 is
a coma patient with family ties (AM and AN). Here, the value co-destruc-
tion process is unintentional and causes value co-destruction spill-over
effects, i.e. on the patient's side A2's family fares worse due to their fam-
ily member's eudaimonic wellbeing further deteriorating. On the special-
ist's side, A1's careless behaviour impacts their reputation, the depart-
ment's or even the clinic's (actors AO and AP).
4.3. Towards a taxonomy for individual and collective (un)intentionality in
value and wellbeing co-creation and co-destruction
he list of eight scenarios above is not exhaustive. These scenar-
ios focus on actor-to-actor interactions at the micro system level result-
ing in value co-creation or co-destruction outcomes for the involved ac-
tors as well as spill-over effects on other actors in the vicinity. “[O]ne
must recognise the existence of [potentially] multiple targets—whether
intended as such or not—who [might] exist in concert, not in isola-
tion” (Lepak et al., 2007, p. 187). However, as also already visible in
some of these scenarios, intended and unintended individual and col-
lective actions may also lead to value co-creation and co-destruction
with more widespread spill-over effects. For example, this can eventu-
ate via the discovery of a new treatment regime that can subsequently
be used for all other actors with the same medical condition or the de-
struction of drugs which then impacts the entire cohort of patients in
need of that very medicine. These examples demonstrate that affected
actors can either be in close proximity of the focal actors or be at a
larger distance with no direct connections or ties but be removed in
space within the wider service ecosystem. Such spatial distance can, for
example, be prevalent when patients reside in remote areas and are de-
pendent on medication that was meant to be shipped to them but was
intentionally destroyed or withheld by actors in charge of its distribu-
tion. In terms of the temporal dimension, while the effects can be rather
immediate, activities might also cause ripple effects with a delay. The
lack in supply of required medication might impact immediately when
the entire charge is destroyed, but effects could also be delayed when
other hospitals in remote areas still have sufficient supplies for the time
being. Finally, (un)intentional actions can impact actors at the same or
at different system levels of the service ecosystem (Beirão et al., 2017;
Gummesson, 2006; Pinho et al., 2014). For example, while the lack
of medication might affect physicians and other patients in the same
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new treatment regime might not only serve all actors with the same
medical condition but it might increase treatment rates for the hospi-
tal (meso level, cf. Beirão et al., 2017) and ultimately influence pa-
tient intake. This might also mean that the government (at macro level)
has to take action and the ministry of health might have to put in place
new regulations for the newly discovered treatment (cf. Beirão et al.,
2017).
Fig. 5 presents an overview of the categories applicable to under-
standing and structuring intentionality for co-creative or co-destructive
activities, as well as their effects. The taxonomy highlights the categories
mentioned above which, when combined differently, might lead to vari-
ous scenarios of intended and unintended effects for focal and other ac-
tors with or without a time lag, and either in close proximity or at a dis-
tance, both potentially leading to an increase or decrease of wellbeing
of actors who can be located at different system levels.
4.4. Implications, limitations and future directions
Value co-creation and to a lesser degree value co-destruction has
been topical in academic discussion for quite some time (Plé and
Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010; Vargo and Lusch, 2016), however, partic-
ularly with the introduction of a wellbeing focus to service research via
the concept of TSR, intended but also unintended consequences of value
co-creation have been highlighted (Anderson et al., 2013; Kuppel-
wieser and Finsterwalder, 2016). Nevertheless, despite recent calls
to investigate unintended spill-over effects (Blocker et al., 2019), no
effort has been made to date to conceptually explore this in service re-
lated wellbeing research.
This paper makes the following contributions to theory. First, it in-
troduces and then conceptually anchors the construct of intentionality in
wellbeing research for a better understanding of intended but in partic-
ular unintended effects of wellbeing efforts. Second, it provides clarity
to a fuzzy discussion that tries to comprehend the interrelationship be-
tween wanted and unwanted wellbeing outcomes (cf. Anderson et al.,
2013). Third, it utilises scenario technique, rarely employed in service
or wellbeing related research, to broaden the understanding of the vari-
ety of scenarios (un)intended wellbeing activities can generate. Fourth,
the paper introduces a taxonomy that aids with structuring the pathways
that can lead to intended and unintended wellbeing outcomes. The tax-
onomy can be comprehended as a forecasting tool to avoid the realisa-
tion of non-desired scenarios, including unintended outcomes when ini-
tiating the design of transformative services. Fifth, this paper conceptu-
ally underscores that intentionality is an explanatory factor that can as-
sist in comprehending actors’ co-creative efforts. Whereas previous work
(Plé and Chumpitaz Cáceres 2010; Echeverri and Skålén 2011) fo-
cuses on direct service interactions, this paper extends the view by pro-
viding a framework to understand actors and their interactions in ser-
vice ecosystems with potential spill-over effects in the same or other ser-
vice ecosystems. Sixth, the introduction of the concept of intentionality
to the wellbeing discussion in service research aims at stimulating fur-
ther conceptual but also empirical work, as outlined below.
From a practical point of view, implications for policymakers and
practitioners are to be more cautious in the design of transformative
services to avoid negative effects on the immediate environment but
also on the wider ecosystem. While wellbeing measures might intend
to solve important issues for a particular target group, other groups
on the periphery or even far removed from the course of action might
not be the focal point of service designers. Therefore, design sessions
need to include stakeholders from the different system levels with a per-
ception of wider reaching implications of the effects of transformative
services. Equally, policymakers should consider built-in “safety mecha-
nisms” at multiple levels when devising and revising public policy to
avoid spill-over effects in other areas of the service ecosystem.
This paper has limited its investigation to scenarios of intention(al-
ity) where positive and negative spill-over effects might occur which
have to be either supported or prevented, moderated or minimised.
However, there also exist rare occasions where negative intentional-
ity might return positive wellbeing outcomes (cf. Li and Tomasello,
2018). Nevertheless, such intentionality was out of scope for this paper.
Future research should integrate intentionality in the discourse on
wellbeing or value co-creation/co-destruction. Such a step would likely
reduce ambiguity among scholars, policymakers and practitioners who
are concerned with analysing, designing and deciding on existing and
new initiatives that improve wellbeing and quality of life. Moreover, fur-
ther conceptual anchoring but also empirical work is needed to better
understand the consequences of intentionality, particularly the negative
spill-over effects on other actors and the wider service ecosystem. Here,
intentionality both at an individual but also at a collective level requires
empirical investigation. Questions, such as, whether there is a certain
threshold where positive intentionality “tips over” and results in nega-
tive intentionality and outcomes for certain actors, or whether there is a
domino effect in terms of positive or negative effects on other actors, are
of importance. Such questions could be tested using an experimental or
case study design and these methods could also be employed to further
explore scenarios like the ones depicted above.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2019.101922.
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